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This paper surveys the recent literature on fiscal sustainability, with 
particular emphasis on emerging market countries. It discusses the main 
elements that differentiate emerging market countries from industrial 
countries and then discusses how probabilistic models can help to evaluate 
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  3  41.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, we review the recent literature on fiscal sustainability with particular 
reference to the problems that are specific to Emerging Market countries (EMs). In this 
setting, the paper focuses on the role of currency and maturity mismatches, Original Sin, 
Sudden Stops in capital flows, debt intolerance, and concessional debt.   
After discussing standard models of fiscal sustainability, the paper highlights the 
importance of moving from deterministic models of fiscal sustainability to probabilistic 
models. To highlight differences across methodologies, the paper evaluates fiscal 
sustainability in Ecuador by using three different methodologies: (i) the standard 
approach; (ii) the probabilistic model developed by Mendoza and Oviedo (2003); and 
(iii) the Sudden Stop approach developed by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002).   
While the original literature on fiscal sustainability mostly focused on industrial 
countries (see, for instance, Buiter, 1985 and Blanchard, 1990) there are, by now, a few 
pieces that, like this one, focus on fiscal sustainability in EMs. Work that is closely 
related to ours includes Mendoza (2003).  Other relevant papers include IMF (2002, 
2003b), Chalk and Hemming (2000), and Cuddington (1996). Izquierdo and Panizza 
(2003) use an approach that is identical to that of this paper to evaluate sustainability in 
Egypt. Four papers that are closely related to our work on Ecuador are Artana, Tour and 
Navajas (2002), López-Cálix (2003), Tinsley (2003) and Barnhill and Kopits (2003).  
The latter two papers evaluate fiscal sustainability in Ecuador, but while Tinsley uses a 
standard sustainability approach, Barnhill and Kopits use a stochastic approach based on 
a value-at-risk model.  One important theme that is not covered in this paper relates to 
how public private partnerships (PPP) should be included in fiscal accounts and 
sustainability analysis. Readers interested in this topic should refer to IMF (2004) and, 
for a theoretical analysis of PPP, to Hart (2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of fiscal 
sustainability and discusses its main definitions and the main sustainability indicators that 
have been proposed in the literature. Section 3 focuses on the case of EMs, discusses 
what makes these countries different from industrial countries, and briefly touches on the 
recent debate on whether investment expenditure should be included in fiscal targets. 
  5Section 4 briefly discusses the main stochastic models of fiscal sustainability, with 
particular emphasis on the model developed by Mendoza and Oviedo (2003). Section 5 
discusses the case of Ecuador, describing the recent economic evolution of the country 
and conducting three different fiscal sustainability exercises. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  What Do We Mean by Fiscal Sustainability? 
 
The term “fiscal sustainability” is often used without a clear definition. Drawing on an 
analogy with household behavior, a country’s policies are defined as fiscally sustainable 
if they lead to a situation in which the country can satisfy its budget constraint. However, 
Mendoza (2003) suggests that this is an imprecise definition of sustainability. He points 
out that the “true” budget constraint is an accounting identity that, by definition, is 
always satisfied.  A government, for instance, can decide to satisfy its budget constraint 
by not paying (via outright default) or by inflating away its debt. In this sense, any 
analysis of fiscal sustainability ultimately reflects a value judgment on the cost and 
benefits of alternative adjustment mechanisms. So, standard sustainability analysis 
implicitly assumes that adjustments through the level and composition of tax revenue or 
primary expenditure are preferable to adjustments via default or inflation (Mendoza, 
2003). 
 
2.1   Solvency versus Sustainability 
 
IMF (2002) and Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) discuss the difference between solvency 
and sustainability. According to their definition, a set of policies is unsustainable if it 
leads to insolvency (solvency is defined as a situation in which the future paths of 
spending and revenue satisfy the inter-temporal budget constraint).  However, they 
suggest that solvency is only a necessary condition for sustainability because solvency 
could be achieved with very large and costly future adjustments. Sustainability, however, 
requires achieving solvency with unchanged policies.  So, we can define a policy stance 
as sustainable if “a borrower is expected to be able to continue servicing its debt without 
an unrealistically large future correction to the balance of income and expenditure” (IMF, 
2002, p. 4).  
  6  With these considerations in mind, we define as sustainable a situation that 
satisfies the following two conditions: (i) a country can satisfy its current period budget 
constraint without resorting to default or excessive debt monetization; and (ii) a country 
does not keep accumulating debt while knowing that a major future adjustment will be 
needed in order to be able to service its debt. 
  Up to this point, we have made use of two key terms in the fiscal sustainability 
debate without properly defining them. These terms are “current period budget 
constraint” and “inter-temporal budget constraint.”  The current period budget constraint 
is an expression that equates the flows of government revenues and expenditures with 
changes in the stock of public debt and in the monetary base. Formally: 
 
() t t t t t t t REV G iD M M D D − + = − + − + + ) ( 1 1     (1) 
 
where  measures the stock of public debt (measured at the beginning of the period),  D
M is the monetary base,  is the interest rate paid by government debt,   is government 
expenditure on goods and services, and 
i G
REV  represents taxation (net of transfers) and 
other revenues (such as royalties from natural resources).  The equation above clearly 
shows that a given deficit can be financed either by issuing debt (bond financing) or by 
printing money (money financing). As excessive money financing may lead to high 
inflation, equation (1) is often written as ( ) t D t D − +1  =iD + - .  It should be clear 
that equation (1) does not impose a strong constraint on governments that are able to 
issue debt. In fact, Wilcox (1989) points out that “virtually any pattern of deficit would 
be sustainable if it were possible to borrow money and pay the interest by borrowing 
more” (p. 291). 
t t G t REV
  The inter-temporal constraint, instead, imposes a limit on the government’s ability 
to borrow indefinitely, by requiring net initial debt plus the present value of expected 
future government expenditures to be equal to (or not greater than) the present value of 
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  7where   denotes expectation taken at time t, and all other variables are defined as 
above. Note that evaluating equation (2) requires formulating expectations on the future 
path of government revenues and expenditures.  Furthermore, we greatly simplified 
equation (2) by assuming that the interest rate paid on government debt is constant and 
equal to the discount rate. Relaxing these assumptions would further complicate the 
analysis.
1   
t E
  One implication of equation (2) is that in the limit (as t goes to infinity), the 
present value of debt in the terminal period should be zero. Formally, equation (2) 
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Condition (3) is often referred to as the No-Ponzi-Game condition (NPG). As 
sustainability requires that the NPG should be satisfied without a radical change in 
policies, sustainability can be tested by looking at whether the current fiscal stance will 
eventually lead to a violation of (3).  Starting with Hamilton and Flavin (1986), a long 
series of papers have used data from OECD countries to perform sustainability tests.
2 As 
these types of tests require long time series of fiscal data (and these time series should not 
have large structural breaks), research on developing countries has been much more 
limited.  
 
2.2 Sustainability Indicators 
   
As formal tests of sustainability tend to be problematic and rather demanding in terms of 
data requirements, some analysts have developed rule of thumb indicators aimed at 
checking whether current policies can stabilize or reduce a given debt ratio. While these 
                                                 












































 where δ  is the 
time-varying discount rate. 
2 For a survey of these papers, see Cuddington (1996). Bohn (1995) was the first to explicitly include 
uncertainty in these tests. 
  8indicators have the advantage of being simple, it should be recognized that they are not 
based on any well-specified definition of sustainability.
3  
  The starting point for deriving these indicators is the current period budget 
constraint of equation (1) that, after dividing all variables by GDP, can be re-written as: 
 
ps d g r d − − = ∆ ) (      (4) 
 
where d is the debt to GDP ratio, r the steady state real interest rate, g the long-run 
growth rate of real GDP, and ps the primary surplus (defined as (REV-G)/GDP). A 
positive value of (4) indicates that debt to GDP is expanding and may be interpreted as an 
unsustainable policy. After setting  d ∆ equal to zero, Equation 4 is often rewritten as  ps  
=  , and ps is interpreted as the primary surplus required to stabilize the debt-to-
GDP ratio for a given real interest rate, growth rate of the economy, and initial stock of 
debt.
4  Given its simplicity, equation (4) is probably the most commonly used indicator of 
sustainability.
5  
d g r ) ( −





r g ps SUS − − =      (5) 
 
where W is public sector net worth and all other variables are defined as above.  The 
second term on the right hand side of equation (5) is equal to the primary surplus that 
keeps the public sector wealth-to-GDP ratio constant. So, according to this indicator, 
sustainability depends on the difference between actual primary surplus (ps) and the 
surplus that stabilizes net government wealth (scaled by GDP). Negative values of SUS 
are taken as an indication that the current fiscal stance is unsustainable. One advantage of 
                                                 
3 For a description of the practical approach to sustainability followed by the IMF, see Chalk and Hemming 
(2000). 
4 All the indicators discussed in this section assume that  0 ) ( > − g r , which is a necessary condition for 
dynamic efficiency (for a discussion on this condition, see Blanchard, 1990). 
5 Equation (4) is the standard textbook formulation of the evolution of debt over GDP. A more precise 
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. For all practical purposes, 
the two definitions yield similar debt-stabilizing primary surpluses. 
  9(5) is that it explicitly assumes that government expenditure could increase government 
wealth (this is one of the points recently raised by some developing countries, which we 
will discuss in detail later).  One of the main problems with equation (5) is that 
government net worth is very difficult to measure.  
  Blanchard (1990) defines a set of sustainability indicators that require computing 
the constant tax rate that satisfies  = E( +
* t e d g r ) ( − ), where  measures taxes over 
GDP and e government expenditure over GDP.
6  This technique can be used to compute 
short-run (where expectations are replaced with current values of e,  r, and g) or, 
depending on the length of the period for which expectations are taken, medium and 
long-run indicators.   Blanchard (1990) points out that  has an easy interpretation 
because it is equal to the annuity value of expected future spending and transfers plus the 
difference between expected real interest rate and growth rate multiplied by the current 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, if  is larger than the current tax rate ( ), an adjustment in 
spending or taxation will be required and hence the fiscal policy stance would not be 
sustainable. The sustainability indicator ( -   ) measures the size of the required 






Blanchard (1990) suggests that different values of ( -  ) will have different 
implications for sustainability depending on the starting level  . Countries with a low tax 
rate may have more room to adjust, while countries that already have high tax levels or 
limited ability to raise taxes (maybe because of the presence of a large informal sector, as 






  There are several caveats that apply to the indicators discussed above. First, they 
mostly focus on stabilizing a particular debt-to-GDP ratio but do not say anything about 
the optimality of this ratio. Hence, some countries may need to aim at a lower debt target, 
and sustainability should be defined as the policy stance needed to reach this new target.  
Second, all the indicators discussed so far are sufficient (but not necessary) 
conditions for long-run sustainability. There are good reasons why a country may want to 
                                                 
6 Under certainty, as  g t ps − = , this is equivalent to  ps   = ( d g r ) − . 
  10run a large deficit. Hence, it may be sub-optimal to prevent a country from smoothing 
expenditure (or conducting counter-cyclical policies) because this would lead to 
overshooting a fiscal ratio that corresponds to a long-run equilibrium (see, for instance, 
the discussion on the Growth and Stability Pact within the European Monetary Union).   
Third, these indicators require assumptions on GDP growth, interest rates, 
government expenditures and revenues, and implicitly assume that these variables are 
exogenous. However, most of these variables tend to be endogenous and correlated with 
each other.  It is clearly unrealistic to assume that changes in the primary deficit will have 
no effect on the interest rate and growth, or that changes in growth do not affect the 
primary surplus.  Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) propose a recursive fiscal sustainability 
indicator aimed at addressing these issues.  They derive the primary surplus and discount 
rate that would prevail when a country reaches its target debt-to-GDP ratio and then build 
a fiscal sustainability indicator that lets these variables react to shocks that move the 
debt-to-GDP ratio out of its equilibrium value.  This indicator identifies the reaction 
function of the government, and, hence, lets the analyst evaluate whether the fiscal stance 
is moving towards or away from sustainability.   
  Finally, most of these indicators do not take into account a host of factors that 
characterize the situation of most emerging market and developing countries and greatly 
increase uncertainty.  
 
3.  Why Are Emerging Markets Different? 
 
Several features make emerging market countries different from OECD countries, for 
which most of the indicators discussed above have been derived.  In particular, EMs 
often have limited capacity to raise taxes (because of a large informal sector) and a 
volatile revenues base; they are also subject to large external shocks (both real and 
financial) that increase the volatility of GDP growth and debt service and characterized 
by high levels of liability dollarization (see IMF 2003c). All these elements complicate 
the management of fiscal policy and greatly increase the difficulty of evaluating 
sustainability.  
                                                                                                                                                 
7 However, countries with larger public sector and larger tax bases have more ability to adjust. See IDB 
  11In order to clarify this statement, let us start by modifying equation (4) to include 
some of the elements that are common to EMs: 
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where α  is the share of debt denominated in local currency at a fixed (long-term) interest 
rate, and 
dl r  is the corresponding real interest rate. β  is the share of debt denominated in 
local currency at a floating (short-term) interest rate and 
ds r  is the corresponding real 
interest rate.  γ  is the share of debt denominated in foreign currency, ε  is nominal 
depreciation, π  is inflation,
f r  is the international interest rate, and ρ  is country risk. (1-
α -β -γ ) is official debt contracted with multilateral or bilateral institutions.
8 In contrast 
to OECD countries, in the typical EM β  and γ  tend to be high and α  tends to be small.  
Therefore, EMs will tend to have a large share of their debt in either domestic currency at 
a floating rate or in foreign currency at a fixed rate. (While some EMs have a substantial 
share of concessional and official debt, but this tends to be the case for poorer developing 
countries.
9) 
  It is now easy to see how the characteristics of EMs complicate the sustainability 
exercises discussed in the previous section.  
Real External Shocks (such as a terms of trade shock) tend to be larger in EMs. 
This affects the volatility of GDP growth and hence makesg difficult to estimate. There 
is also some evidence that the effect of external shocks is amplified by the presence of 
Sudden Stops in capital flows (Galindo and Izquierdo, 2003a). 
A Weak Fiscal Position is another key characteristic of EMs and developing 
countries. Fiscal policies and budget institutions in EMs are often not credible, and this 
prevents them from managing counter-cyclical policies by making credible 
announcements to reduce public expenditure or cut taxes in good times (see IMF, 2003c).  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995). 
8 We assume that this debt is contracted at the international interest rate. In some cases the actual rate will 
be higher (when the debt is not concessional) and in others, lower. However, this does not change our 
analysis as long as the interest rate applied to this type of debt has limited volatility.   
9 Edwards (2002) and IMF (2003a) focus on debt sustainability in low-income countries. 
  12Liability Dollarization and Original Sin refer to the fact that in most EMs there 
are limited opportunities to borrow long-term in the country’s own currency (hence, EMs 
have high values of β  and γ ).
10  Because of pervasive liability dollarization, EMs tend 
to suffer from “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Hausmann, Panizza and 
Stein, 2001) and hence tend to overstabilize the exchange rate, even if the exchange rate 
regime is formally announced as a flexible one. However, stabilizing the exchange rate 
requires large adjustments in the domestic interest rate, and this amplifies uncertainty 
about the costs linked to servicing debt expressed in domestic currency at a floating rate. 
At the same time, episodes of financial contagion and the possibility of self-fulfilling 
fiscal crises affect country risk and increase the volatility of the cost of servicing foreign 
currency debt. Barnhill and Kopits (2003) point out that as the budget constraint of EMs 
is particularly difficult to observe, investor sentiments tend to be particularly volatile. 
These shocks may lead to multiple equilibria: a country that under a tranquil condition 
may have a perfectly sustainable policy stance may suddenly jump to an unsustainable 
situation just because fear of default leads international investors to ask for larger risk 
premia.  Barnhill and Kopits (2003) study the case of Ecuador and show that the 
volatility of the sovereign spread is a major source of fiscal vulnerability, and is more 
important than terms of trade shocks. In this sense, there are instances in which the 
behavior of creditors is the ultimate determinant of sustainability. 
Sudden Stops in capital flows could also be a key determinant of sustainability.  
For instance, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) argue that a loss of access to credit 
markets need not be the result of over-indebtedness in the context of a good equilibrium, 
but rather the result of an economy having fallen into a bad equilibrium triggered by a 
Sudden Stop in capital flows.  This Inverse Fiscal View finds support in the fact that 
Sudden Stop episodes tend to occur around the same time, and for countries exhibiting a 
variety of fiscal situations.  Sudden Stops in capital flows force abrupt adjustments of the 
current account deficit that may require a large adjustment (depreciation) of the real 
                                                 
10 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003a) point out that this is especially true in the case of external 
debt. They define Original Sin as the inability of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency. In earlier 
work, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) used the term Original Sin to refer to both the inability of some 
countries to borrow abroad in their own currencies and their inability to borrow at home at long maturities.  
For a discussion of the determinants of Original Sin, see Hausmann and Panizza (2003). 
  13exchange rate (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2003). These adjustments may have large 
valuation effects and multiply the cost of servicing foreign currency debt because of 
excessive liability dollarization, thus pushing a country over the edge of 
unsustainability.
11 There is also evidence that, apart from amplifying the effect of Sudden 
Stops, liability dollarization may itself be a determinant of the probability of having a 
Sudden Stop (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía, 2003) 
Debt is riskier in EMs,  leading to a situation in which relatively low (for 
industrial country standards) debt-to-GDP ratios lead to very poor credit ratings. 
Switzerland and Costa Rica have similar debt-to-GDP ratios, and so do the United States 
and Turkey—or Italy, Japan, and Belgium and Jordan, Pakistan and Jamaica. However, 
these EMs have very different credit ratings than those of developed countries. 
Switzerland, United States, Italy, Japan and Belgium have a rating of at least AA, while 
the EMs listed above are well below investment grade.  This de-linkage between credit 
ratings and debt ratios has been recognized by several authors (Hausmann, 2003; 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003a and 2003b; and Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano, 2003) who, however, attribute it to different causes. Hausmann (2003) and 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003b) emphasize the role of Original Sin and 
suggest that foreign currency debt makes the cost of servicing the debt dependent on the 
real exchange rate, which is uncertain and pro-cyclical. As these elements increase the 
probability of being in a state of the world in which payment becomes very difficult, they 
will lead to lower credit ratings.
12 Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), instead, 
introduce the concept of “debt intolerance” and define it as the inability of emerging 
markets to manage levels of external debt that are manageable for advanced industrial 
countries. In their view, lower credit ratings are due to poor credibility (proxied by high 
                                                 
11 A liquidity crisis arises when an otherwise solvent debtor does not have enough liquid assets to meet or 
roll over its maturing liabilities. IMF (2002) correctly points out that liquidity may not be an issue for low 
income countries that, while having high debt ratio, do not need to borrow from the private capital market 
(because most of their external liabilities are with official creditors). However, it is a serious issue for even 
moderately indebted EMs.  
12 Hausmann (2003) discusses a formal model. 
  14levels of past inflation) and a history of repeated default.
13 Finally, Mendoza (2003) 
emphasizes the role of limited and volatile tax bases.
14  
Whatever the cause is (and irrespective of whether there is a solution), there is a 
consensus that under the current rules of the game, EMs can safely manage only fairly 
low levels of external debt. While IMF (2002) sets the threshold for a safe level of debt at 
around 40 percent of GDP, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) are even more 
pessimistic and argue that some countries may not safely manage levels of external debt 
that are above 15 percent of GDP.  
Non-Renewable Resources may affect the outcome of standard sustainability 
calculations. Chalk and Hemming (2000) show that in the presence of non-renewable 
resources sustainability would require equalizing a country’s net worth (including the 
value of the nonrenewable resources) to the net present value of primary non-resource 
deficits. This method highlights the fact that increasing resource exploitation to pay debt 
would not affect sustainability. There are, however, at least two problems with this 
“Ricardian equivalence of natural resources.” The first is the same as that highlighted 
above when we discussed Buiter’s indicator of fiscal sustainability, i.e., computing a 
country’s net worth is a very difficult exercise. Second, it assumes that “oil in the 
ground” has the same return as the various financial assets and liabilities of the 
government.  
 Concessional  Debt also plays an important role in determining sustainability. In 
adopting any of the steady-state approaches described above it is important to recognize 
that, as developing countries grow and become richer, the share of their concessional 
debt is bound to decrease and this will increase the cost of financing total debt. This 
increase in the cost of debt should be taken into account in estimating the steady state real 
interest rate paid by government debt.
15  
 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the differences between currency mismatches, debt intolerance, and Original Sin see 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003b). 
14 Tax-to-GDP ratios in industrial countries average above 40 percent, and 30 percent in developing 
countries.  At the same time volatility of tax revenues (measured as the coefficient of variation) tends to be 
twice as large in developing countries.  
15 For a discussion of the relationship between concessional debt, debt relief and fiscal sustainability, see 
Edwards (2002). 
  153.1. Other Issues 
 
In standard IMF-led stabilization programs, countries are often asked to commit to 
achieving a given target in terms of primary deficit with the implicit objective of 
stabilizing or reducing its debt ratios (for a survey, see Chalk and Hemming, 2000). This 
has come under criticism for failing to take into account two factors. The first relates to 
the fact that not all debt has the same level of risk. The second relates to the fact that 
deficits incurred to finance public investment should be treated differently from deficits 
incurred to finance current expenditure.  
  Equation (6) shows that the stock of public sector debt cannot be considered a 
monolithic entity; as discussed above, different types of debt have different implications 
for the volatility of the public sector deficit and, hence, for sustainability. Local currency 
fixed-term debt is clearly the safest form of debt because the cost of servicing this debt is 
by and large predetermined. Foreign currency official debt is also relatively safe. While it 
is subject to exchange rate risk, the interest rates charged by official creditors tend to be 
stable and the flow of financing is either a-cyclical or slightly counter-cyclical.  Local 
currency floating rate debt is subject to interest rate volatility and the cost of servicing 
this kind of debt may increase substantially during periods of financial turmoil. Foreign 
currency non-official debt is the riskiest. The cost of servicing this debt is subject to the 
volatility of both the exchange rate and of sovereign risk (the latter applies only if the 
debt needs to be rolled over). Furthermore, Sudden Stops in capital flows may make 
emerging market governments unable to roll over debt, leading to both liquidity and 
solvency crisis.   
On the basis of these considerations, it has been argued that debt sustainability 
exercises should be performed by making use of weighed debt-to-GDP ratios where, akin 
to the Basel Principles for evaluating banks’ balance sheets, different types of debt 
should be weighted according to their risk. 
  The second issue relates to the way in which investment expenditures should be 
recorded in government accounts. The debate is motivated by the concern that, according 
to current practice, public sector adjustment strategies bundle together current 
expenditure and public investment. In response to this practice, the Rio Group (a 
permanent mechanism of political consultations and interaction among 19 Latin 
  16American countries) has put forward a proposal aimed at excluding investment 
expenditure from fiscal deficit targets.
16 The main argument in favor of this proposal is 
that, as current expenditure tends to be difficult to adjust (because it is mostly composed 
of wages and entitlement programs), investment is the typical adjustment variable when 
the deficit exceeds the target. The proposal argues that the inclusion of investment 
expenditures in the target budget balance may be problematic because it basically 
considers every increase in debt as a reduction in government wealth, implicitly 
assigning no value to investment expenditure as an addition to net wealth. The Rio 
Group, instead, would favor the adoption of sustainability indicators similar to the one 
proposed by Buiter (equation 2).  
As mentioned above, a potential problem with targets based on net worth is that 
net worth is very difficult to measure. Furthermore, this issue is linked to the role that the 
public sector in an EM should play in terms of its investment strategy.  EMs typically 
face periods of financial constraints where capital markets close, and they are subject to 
credibility problems regarding their ability to remain sustainable in times of distress.  
Crises occur in a context in which expenditure remains inflexible, particularly given its 
high wage content, and there are a myriad of unsatisfied social demands facing EMs.  
Under this scenario, it may be beneficial for the government to remain involved only in 
co-financing investment activities that would otherwise not be carried out completely by 
the private sector and that are deemed to be socially profitable (instead of assuming 
responsibility for full financing of investment projects).  This, of course, does not mean 
that governments should not invest, but that they should do so selectively, 
complementing private sector participation.  If this principle is accepted, it follows that 
the share of a project that is financed by the government is, essentially, a subsidy—and, 
as such, should be computed “above the line.”  This does not imply that public 
investment will always result in a higher fiscal deficit, because account should be taken 
of the possibly higher fiscal revenue that such investment might entail (and which, again, 
should be computed “above the line”).  Of course, to the extent that governments are not 
following this rule, there is still an issue regarding the need for accounting public 
                                                 
16 This principle was restated in the “Carta de Lima” signed by several Latin American finance ministers at 
the 2004 meetings of the Inter-American Development Bank that were held in Lima Peru.  
  17investment as an addition to net wealth, but then again, there are several factors that 
make valuation of this investment quite difficult, particularly because this capital is not 
easily marketable, being in essence a non-tradable good.
17   
 
4.  Evaluating Sustainability under Uncertainty 
 
Standard sustainability analysis starts by picking values for steady state growth and the 
real interest rate, and then uses these values to compute the level of primary surplus that 
is consistent with debt stabilization. The previous section examined how evaluating 
sustainability in emerging markets and developing countries is more difficult than 
evaluating sustainability in industrial countries because emerging market countries are 
characterized by higher volatility in both revenue and expenditure. Consequently, the 
various implications based on steady-state values for growth and the real interest rate 
(where volatility is not an issue) may not make much sense. 
In this vein, a new policy paper published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2003b) describes several methodologies to stress test standard sustainability 
analysis with shocks to the main macroeconomic variables (this could be done by 
observing the past volatility of the main variables or by using stochastic simulations) and 
explicitly including contingent liabilities. These simulations can then be used to build 
confidence intervals around the projected evolution of debt to GDP.  
To address the issue of volatility, some authors are now developing probabilistic 
models of sustainability that specifically take into account volatility in macroeconomic 
variables.  Barnhill and Kopits (2003) develop models based on the concept of value at 
risk and apply it to the case of Ecuador. Hausmann (2003) also uses the concept of value 
at risk and applies it in a cross-country context. Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) develop a 
stochastic model aimed at deriving a fiscal policy rule that is observable by external 
analysts and indicates whether a country is adopting a sustainable policy stance. As 
surveying all these models would require a considerable amount of space and 
technicality, in our analysis, we will focus on the probabilistic model developed for the 
Inter-American Development Bank by Mendoza and Oviedo (2003). This is the model 
                                                 
17 See forthcoming IDB notes on public investment for a detailed discussion. 
  18that we will use as a benchmark for our analysis, focusing on revenue volatility and 
expenditure inflexibility. Section 4.1 describes the main characteristics of the model.  We 
then illustrate its application for the case of Ecuador in Section 5.1.  
 
4.1 The Mendoza-Oviedo Model  
 
The guiding principle of the Mendoza-Oviedo (MO) model is that of “credible payment 
commitment” (CPC). According to their definition, a commitment to repay is credible 
only if the government is able (if not necessarily willing) to repay its debt in every state 
of nature.
18  This implies that the government cannot accumulate more debt than the level 
it could service if it were to enter a fiscal crisis, defined as the case in which the primary 
balance remains forever at its lowest possible value.  Were the actual level of debt to 
remain higher than the threshold determined by the CPC, then the government would be 
facing a positive probability of default on its debt, something a risk-averse lender would 
not allow to happen.
19 
  With these considerations in mind, Mendoza and Oviedo (2003) develop a full-
blown dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the path of government 
revenues is endogenously determined by the behavior of utility-maximizing individuals 
and profit-maximizing firms, in a context where both tradable and non-tradable goods are 
produced.  In their model, there is a mismatch in the government’s balance sheet because 
the government debt is mostly denominated in tradables and tax revenues are mostly 
denominated in non-tradables.  They also assume that volatility in government revenues 
can be traced back to volatility in fundamentals such as the terms of trade, foreign 
interest rates, or productivity.  As discussing the full specification of this model would 
require considerable technical detail, we follow a simplified version of Mendoza and 
Oviedo (2003) that transmits the flavor of its more complex formulation.  This simplified 
version is the one we use to conduct an application to Ecuadorian data in Section 5.2.   
We make the following three assumptions: (i) the path of government revenues is 
stochastic and exogenously determined; (ii) there is no currency mismatch (government 
                                                 
18 Including the case in which government revenues (expressed as a share of GDP) remain indefinitely at 
their minimum.  
19 For more on this, including a discussion on outcomes using optimal contracts, see Mendoza (2003). 
  19revenues and debt are denominated in the same currency); and (iii) both the interest rate 
(r) and long-run GDP growth (g) are known with certainty. 
These assumptions lead to a simple formulation of the credible repayment 












min min .     (7) 
 
Here   represents the threshold value for the debt to GDP ratio, t  is the lowest 
possible realization of government revenues over GDP, and   is the minimum level of 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio that can be sustained if the country were to enter a 
fiscal crisis in which tax revenue reaches (and stays at)   and pushes d above d .  In 
this model (abstracting from willingness to pay issues) the government would always be 
able to repay any debt level below d*.  Thus, the interest rate investors will charge is the 





Heuristically,   measures a government’s ability to reduce expenditure in the 
presence of a prolonged negative shock to revenue.  Countries that can sustain larger 
adjustments will be able to sustain larger debt-to-GDP ratios relative to countries with 
rigid public expenditure. 
min e
  In this version of the model, the government has a constant desired level of 
primary expenditure,  .  Each period, it observes the realization of revenue and finances 
any gap between revenue and total expenditure (including interest payments) with new 
debt, as long as the resulting debt does not hit the debt threshold d*.  Otherwise, it needs 
to adjust expenditure in order to meet the debt threshold restriction.  Thus, as long as debt 





t t t t t e
g
r





− ) 1 (
) 1 (
1        (8) 
  20 
Given an initial debt level, and a sequence of revenue realizations based on the 
stochastic characteristics of the revenue process (mean, standard deviation, and 
persistence), the model generates a set of relevant results despite its simplicity.  Not only 
does it determine a threshold debt level, but it also produces a probability distribution of 
debt  n periods ahead. This probability distribution can then be used to calculate the 
probability of reaching the debt threshold at any given point in time.    
  An important difference between the approach to sustainability of Mendoza and 
Oviedo and the traditional long-run approach is that the traditional approach defines a 
policy target (expressed as the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio) aimed at stabilizing the 
current debt-to-GDP ratio (which is assumed to be the steady state level of debt to GDP). 
In contrast, in the probabilistic model, only the maximum level of debt to GDP is 
defined, but this level is not the equilibrium that will necessarily be observed, and it is 
clearly not  the optimal level of debt.  The task of the government is to strengthen 
fundamentals so that the probability of reaching the upper bound of government debt 
remains low.   
An implication of the probabilistic model is that, for any given average revenue-
to-GDP ratio, governments that have a less volatile revenue base (for instance, 
governments that depend less on natural resources) will have higher values of 
21 and 
hence they will be able to sustain higher levels of debt.  Furthermore, what really matters 
is not the actual value of expenditure adjustment that a country can announce, but the 
value of e  that can be credibly announced. Countries that can commit to a large 
adjustment in expenditure can also sustain higher debt-to-GDP ratios and may never be 




  Mendoza (2003) uses equation (7) to compute sustainable debt-to-GDP ratios 
under different assumptions for the volatility of revenues, the difference between GDP 
growth and the real interest rate, and the ability to adjust expenditure. He shows that the 
                                                                                                                                                 










21 Where, for example, t  is assumed to be equal to the mean minus two standard deviations. 
min
22 Countries could also commit to adjusting their tax rate and, by increasing  , obtain a similar result. 
min t
  21results are very sensitive to the choice of this last parameter.  In particular, he finds that 
emerging market countries that cannot adjust expenditure by more than 1 percent of GDP 
will not be able to sustain positive debt.  Emerging market countries with larger capacity 
to adjust (defined as countries that can adjust the expenditure-to-GDP ratio by at least 8 
percent) may be able to sustain debt-to-GDP ratios that range between 40 and 150 
percent. When he calibrates the results to the “average” emerging market country, he 
finds a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent for low-risk emerging market 
countries (“low-risk” is defined as having a small difference between real interest rate 
and GDP growth) and 30 percent for high-risk emerging market countries. Comparable 
estimations calibrated to industrial countries yield a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio that 
can reach up to 350 percent, with average values of 85 percent.  
Notice that these large differences in sustainability were obtained by just 
assuming differences in the volatility of revenues and the capacity to adjust primary 
expenditure.  Hausmann (2003) suggests that valuation effects brought about by liability 
dollarization and Original Sin are likely to greatly amplify these differences.  In fact, 
liability dollarization, by making a given country riskier, will affect the difference 
between real interest rate and GDP growth, and hence play a role in determining which 
countries are in the high-risk group.  
 
5.  The Case of Ecuador 
 
This section surveys the main issues related to fiscal sustainability in Ecuador, including 
two sustainability exercises, the first related to revenue volatility under the Mendoza-
Oviedo framework, and the second dealing with the effects of Sudden Stops in capital 
flows and the effects of oil price shocks under the Calvo-Izquierdo-Talvi approach. 
 
5.1  Some Stylized Facts 
 
Despite high revenues from oil, the accumulation of persistent fiscal deficits throughout 
the mid-70s and most of the 1980s left Ecuador by 1990 with a high debt-to-GDP ratio of 
about 100 percent.
23  The combination of GDP growth averaging 3.6 percent per year (see 
                                                 
23 World Bank-IDB Ecuador Public Expenditure Review, forthcoming, 2004. 
  22Figure 1), real exchange rate appreciation of 5.3 percent per year, and sound fiscal 
policies that kept public debt almost constant in dollar terms were the main factors 
behind a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio to 68 percent by 1993 (see Figure 2). 
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Source: IMF and Central Bank of Ecuador
 
  23As in many other Latin American countries, 1993 marked the beginning of a 
wave of capital inflows that lasted until 1998, averaging 5.5 percent of GDP (see Figure 
3).  Despite this favorable external environment, resulting in GDP growth of almost 3 
percent per year over the same period, fiscal performance waned, particularly in 1996 and 
1997, even before the materialization of the macroeconomic crisis of 1998.  On average, 
the overall deficit of the Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS) remained at 1 percent of 
GDP for the period 1993-97, before hitting rock bottom in 1998, when it reached 4.8 
percent of GDP (see Figure 4). 
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Source: World Economic Outlook (Apr-2004)  
 
 
Figure  4. Fiscal Performance and Oil cycles in Ecuador 






























































































 El Nino Dollarization
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador and Ministry of Finance
 
  24It should also be noted that 1998 was an extremely difficult year for Ecuador 
because the country was subject to a set shocks affecting its main sources of 
vulnerability: 
•  A Sudden Stop in capital flows that took place in 1998 following the 
Russian crisis of the same year (see Izquierdo, 2002 for more details) 
that turned into a capital flow reversal of about US$3.5 billion by 
1999, equivalent to 20 percent of GDP, or 56 percent of credit to the 
private sector prevailing in 1998.  This reversal brought about a 
dramatic swing in the real exchange rate that seriously diminished 
fiscal sustainability, both directly through debt revaluation as a share 
of GDP,
24 and indirectly through the materialization of contingent 
liabilities derived from the ensuing financial crisis that led to 
bankruptcy for non-tradable sectors with foreign currency debt.
25 
•  A collapse in oil prices (averaging US$9.2 per barrel, the lowest value 
in the 1990s), indeed another relevant shock given the high correlation 
between oil prices and fiscal outcomes (see Figure 4). 
•  The effects of El Niño floods in late 1997 and 1998. 
   
The resulting collapse in revenue, coupled with the costs of the resolution of the 
banking crisis and the reconstruction efforts after El Niño, in a context of closed world 
capital markets, led to enormous pressure for the monetization of fiscal financing needs. 
By early 1999, Ecuador chose to abandon its crawling-band regime in favor of a floating 
exchange rate, but given the pressure coming from the fiscal side, monetary commitments 
were subdued and the monetary system collapsed as devaluation expectations remained 
high. Under these circumstances, the only option for recovering any credibility 
whatsoever was to abdicate monetary policy by dollarizing in 2000. Even then, this 
                                                 
24 Given that most government debt was denominated in foreign currency, whereas GDP has a large non-
tradable component. 
25 The fiscal cost of the banking crisis is estimated at around US$2.6 billion, nearly 20 percent of GDP in 
1999.  See IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/125, October 2000, for more details. 
  25policy was not fully successful until debt-restructuring agreements were reached several 
months later.
26 
The adoption of dollarization, coupled with the closure of capital markets for 
government debt, forced authorities to make drastic adjustments in public finances.  As a 
result, the primary balance, which averaged 2.3 percent of GDP for the 1993-1998 
period, increased all the way to 8.1 percent of GDP in 2000.
27  Since then, and partly as a 
consequence of increasing oil prices, the government has been able to sustain positive 
overall balances (see Figure 4).  Although a substantial effort was carried on in 2000, as 
evidenced by the large primary balance, it has since fallen to much lower levels, and 
Ecuador still remains vulnerable to shocks like the one experienced in 1998.  Even after a 
second debt restructuring undertaken in 2000, the debt-to-GDP ratio remains high, at 
about 54 percent of GDP by end-2003,
28 not too far from the figure prevailing before the 
crisis of 1998. 
Although the Sudden Stop of 1998 led to an economic downturn in the late 1990s 
that worsened Ecuador’s fiscal accounts, the country’s budgetary problems are not purely 
attributable to this event and are rooted in the volatility of its revenues (partly due to the 
high concentration of the export sector) and the rigidity of its expenditures (Artana, Tour 
and Navajas, 2002; López-Cálix, 2003; Jácome, 2004). All these factors contribute to 
making fiscal accounts particularly vulnerable to fiscal shocks, as indicated by the fact 
that Ecuador had to restructure its debt twice in a ten-year period, being the first country 
to default on Brady bonds. 
By taking a look at the main components of Ecuador’s fiscal figures (Table 1), it 
is easy to find structural problems that need to be addressed by a change in policy stance. 
In particular, the accounts of the NFPS show an increase in current expenditure that is 
mostly due to a higher wage bill. Public sector employment and nominal public sector 
                                                 
26 This may be due to the fact that, given the disappearance of a domestic money base to tax via inflation (a 
consequence of dollarization), default risk on government debt increased (as was reflected in the increase 
in government debt spreads), and the economy did not stabilize until debt restructuring took place in the 
second half of 2000.  For more on this see Galindo and Izquierdo (2003b). 
27 We use data from the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
28 In August 2000, the Ecuadorian government restructured its sovereign bonded external debt; moreover, 
in September 2000, Ecuador reached an agreement to reschedule US$880 million of the US$1.3 billion that 
the country owed to the Paris Club of creditor nations, agreeing to repay this amount in an 18-year period 
with a three-year grace period.  
  26wages tend to be very difficult to cut and, in the past, Ecuador has been able to reduce the 
real public sector wage bill through inflation. However, with dollarization, inflation 
through monetary expansion is no longer an option and, hence, a higher public sector 
wage bill may increase the rigidity of the budget and worsen the fiscal situation in the 
coming years. It is worth noting that the increase in current expenditure was balanced by 
a reduction in capital expenditure and, therefore, total expenditure remained more or less 
constant as a share of GDP. The rigidity of Ecuador’s budget is confirmed by a recent 
analysis of the composition of public expenditure, which found that 95 percent of 
revenues are preallocated and only 5 percent are freely available (López-Cálix, 2003).   
 
 
Table 1. Public Sector Operations (percent of GDP) 
 
   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
 
Non Financial Public Sector Results 
Total Revenue  23.4  17.3  21.1  25.9  23.5  25.7  25.7 
     Oil Revenue  5.4  3.9  6.3  9.2  6.4  5.7  6.2 
     Non Oil Revenue  13.3  13.3  14.0  15.8  16.5  19.2  19.0 
           VAT  3.9  3.6  3.5  5.6  6.9  6.8  6.5 
           Income Tax  2.0  1.5  0.9  2.0  2.6  2.4  2.7 
             S o c .  S e c u r i t y
Contribut.         2.3  1.9  1.4  1.4  2.2  3.1  3.4 
                       
Total Expenditure  25.9  22.1  25.0  24.4  23.1  25.1  24.5 
   Current Expenditure  16.8  17.2  19.0  19.4  16.4  18.6  19.1 
       Wages  7.7  7.3  5.9  4.8  5.5  7.2  8.5 
       Interest on Domestic Debt1.0  1.0  2.1  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.7 
       Interest on Foreign Debt  3.7  3.2  5.0  5.4  3.7  2.7  2.4 
   Capital Expenditure  6.2  5.0  6.0  5.0  6.6  6.5  5.4 
                       
Surplus (-Deficit)  -2.1  -4.8  -3.9  1.5  0.4  0.6  1.2 
Primary Surplus (-Deficit)*  2.1  -0.6  3.2  8.1  5.1  4.2  4.3 
  27      Table 1., continued 
 
   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
 
Central Government Results 
Total Revenue  14.6  13.9  16.1  20.4  18.3  18.8  17.8 
     Oil Revenue  5.1  3.8  6.0  8.8  6.1  5.6  5.8 
     Non Oil Revenue  9.5  10.1  10.2  11.6  12.2  13.2  12.0 
           VAT  3.3  3.6  3.3  5.2  6.4  6.3  5.9 
           Income Tax  1.7  1.5  0.7  1.8  2.3  2.2  2.2 
                       
Total Expenditure  15.8  18.0  19.0  20.3  19.0  19.6  18.7 
       Interest on Domestic Debt1.0  1.0  2.0  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.8 
       Interest on Foreign Debt  3.0  3.0  4.7  5.1  3.5  2.6  2.3 
                       
Global Result (Surplus/-
Deficit)  -1.2  -4.1  -2.9  0.1  -0.7  -0.8  -0.9 
Primary Surplus (-Deficit)  2.8  -0.1  3.9  6.5  3.7  2.6  2.2 
 
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador and IDB estimates.  
 
 
While total expenditure has remained more or less constant, the procyclicality of 
tax revenues and shocks to oil prices has led to a situation characterized by extremely 
volatile total revenues (López-Cálix, 2003). Such volatility may lead to structural 
problems because during good times the fiscal situation improves, and this might reduce 
the government’s commitment to fiscal reforms (in fact, there were concerns that the 
country could have lost some steam on its reforms after achieving a 8.1 percent NFPS 
primary surplus in 2000).
29  Concerns about Ecuador’s fiscal performance led Standard 
and Poor’s to downgrade the country’s foreign currency sovereign debt from B- to CCC+ 
in 2001, effectively constraining Ecuador from tapping world capital markets.
30 
The previous analysis suggests that revenue volatility and external shocks such as 
a Sudden Stop in capital flows or a sudden drop in oil revenues might still have a large 
negative impact on Ecuador’s fiscal sustainability.  We analyze these sources of 
vulnerability in the next section. 
                                                 
29 A recent World Bank report states “[Ecuador] must either take the path of austerity and 
competitiveness…or once again squander the country’s petroleum riches” (López-Cálix, 2003, p. 3). 
30 This rating has since been revised several times without major changes; the last revision in September 
2003 left the rating as CCC+ for long-term debt, with a stable outlook, and a short-term rating of C. 
  285.2 Sustainability  Analysis 
 
In this section we assess fiscal sustainability in Ecuador using three exercises: (i) a 
standard sustainability analysis; (ii) the Mendoza-Oviedo (2003) probabilistic approach; 
and (iii) the Calvo-Izquierdo-Talvi (2002) Sudden Stop approach.  
These three approaches are useful in assessing different sustainability issues.  The 
traditional approach, which equates the current debt to GDP ratio to the steady state debt 
level, is useful for calculating the primary surplus that is consistent with that debt at 
various interest rates and growth rates.  The second approach incorporates revenue 
volatility and expenditure flexibility to the previous case.  Finally, the third approach is 
concerned with the effects of an external shock that leads to adjustment in the current 
account balance and real exchange rate depreciation. 
 
Standard Approach to Sustainability 
 
The standard approach requires assumptions on initial debt, steady-state GDP growth and 
steady-state real interest rate. For our baseline calculation, we assume that the starting 
level of debt is 54 percent of GDP, i.e., the value of total public debt prevailing by end-
2003, and we let the steady- state growth rate range between 2 and 5 percent and the real 
interest rate range between 6 and 14 percent.  Figure 5 shows that in the most favorable 
conditions (6 percent real interest rate and 5 percent growth rate of the economy), the 
Ecuadorian government could stabilize debt with a primary surplus equivalent to 0.5 
percent of GDP.  If we move away from this rosy scenario, however, we find that 
required primary surpluses go well above 3 percent of GDP. In particular, if we assume 
that steady-state long run growth is equal to the geometric average of the GDP growth 
observed for the period 1985-2003 (2.5 percent) and the real interest rate is equal to the 
average interest rate that will eventually prevail for Global bonds (which yield a value of 
11 percent
31), we obtain a required primary surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP. This is slightly 
higher than the observed balance for 2002 and 2003.  A first look at these figures would 
seem to indicate that the fiscal position is relatively appropriate, but it must be 
acknowledged that the observed primary surplus was obtained under a very favorable 
context for oil prices and the capital account (see Figures 3 and 4).  The next two sections 
  29will show that once the main sources of volatility related to oil prices and the capital 

















































Probabilistic Approach to Sustainability 
 
The Mendoza-Oviedo (MO) probabilistic approach is useful in illustrating how revenue 
volatility can be incorporated into a sustainability analysis. The MO probabilistic model 
requires information on: (i) volatility of government revenues; (ii) average levels of 
revenue and expenditure; (iii) the size of potential adjustment in expenditure were the 
government to fall into a crisis state; (iv) the world real interest rate; and (v) the 
economy’s steady-state growth rate.   
As a first step, we calculate volatility based on a measure of the cyclical 
component of government revenue (obtained by taking a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the 
log revenue) in real terms for the period 1985-2003.
32  Next, we approximate cyclical 
component behavior to a first-order autoregressive (AR1) process, and take the standard 
deviation of this process as our measure of volatility.  We then transform this volatility in 
terms of government revenue into volatility in terms of government revenue as a share of 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 This is analyzed in more detail in the next section. 
  30GDP, which yields a value of 2.55 percent. Average revenue and average non-interest 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP for the period 1985-2003 were 22.6 percent of GDP 
and 19.4 percent of GDP, respectively. 
To estimate the average growth rate of the economy, we use the same period used 
to estimate volatility and obtain a value of 2.52 percent.
33 For the world real interest rate, 
we make the same assumptions as in Mendoza (2003) and Mendoza and Oviedo (2003) 
and use a value of 6.5 percent. As for the initial amount of debt, we use the prevailing 
level of net public debt at end-2003, equivalent to 54 percent of GDP.    
Finally, in order to compute the potential adjustment in case of fiscal crisis, we 
need to make further assumptions about minimum revenue, as well as the flexibility of 
public expenditure.  We make the two following assumptions: (i) the minimum revenue 
level lies two standard deviations below the mean.  Given our measures for volatility and 
mean revenue, this yields a value of tmin equal to 17.5 percent of GDP; and (ii) the 
government can reduce non-interest expenditure in the neighborhood of 30 percent 
(departing from current expenditure levels) in the event of a fiscal crisis.
34 All the 
assumptions necessary to perform the sustainability exercise are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Baseline Assumptions for the MO Model Applied to Ecuador 
 
Variable Value 
Volatility of government revenues (percentage of GDP)  2.55% 
Average levels of revenue (percentage of GDP)  22.61% 
Average levels of non-interest expenditure (percentage of GDP)  19.37% 
Minimum level of revenues (percentage of GDP)  17.5% 
Maximum expenditure adjustment   28.5% 
World real interest rate  6.5% 
Initial level of debt (percentage of GDP)   54% 
Steady state GDP growth  2.52% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 We compute trend revenue using data on general government (NFPS) for the period 1985-2003.  We 
excluded the period 1980-1984 from our estimations to avoid excessive volatility derived from the massive 
adjustment that the debt crisis of the 1980s brought to Ecuador.  
33 Computed as a geometric average from IMF/IFS GDP data. 
34 The exact figure is 28.5 percent, and it is chosen to maximize the size of the primary balance in times of 
crisis so that the debt threshold remains slightly above current debt levels. 
  31The assumption on the ability to adjust non-interest expenditure is particularly 
important and merits further discussion.  In particular, we assumed an ability to adjust 
expenditure that is quite large. We use this rate of reduction in our estimations to 
maximize the size of the primary balance in times of crisis in order to keep debt limits 
above current debt levels.  This does not imply that the government can realistically be 
expected to reach this level of expenditure reduction.  This value of expenditure 
reduction is chosen mainly to illustrate the usefulness of this approach in analyzing debt 
sustainability.  Lower levels of potential reduction in government spending would lower 
the size of the debt threshold, thus making crisis much more likely.  However, it must be 
noted that, during the 1999 crisis, Ecuador’s government expenditures represented 
approximately 70 percent of their 2003 value in real terms, providing some indication 
that Ecuador has been able to live with much lower levels of public expenditure, although 
amidst an appalling fiscal and financial crisis.  
Figure 6 is helpful in depicting debt threshold sensitivity to different assumptions 
on revenue volatility and expenditure adjustment. Taking interest and growth rates as 
given, the figure illustrates the values of the debt thresholds (d*) that would be obtained 
under different assumptions for revenue volatility and expenditure adjustment. Using as a 
benchmark our estimates mentioned above for revenue volatility and expenditure 
adjustment, the debt threshold hovers around 54 percent of GDP. Lower values of 
volatility would allow for higher debt levels.  For instance, by reducing volatility to 2 
percent (and maintaining the same level of expenditure adjustment), we obtain a debt 
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Figure 6. Debt threshold sensitivity analysis
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On the other hand, if we were to relax our assumption that the government can 
adjust expenditure by almost 30 percent and replace it with the assumption that it can 
adjust expenditure by only 20 percent, we would obtain a debt threshold close to 8 
percent of GDP. This would imply that current debt is already above the threshold that 
guarantees debt repayment under all states of nature and that Ecuador would already be 
in a state of fiscal crisis (i.e., current debt is already above the threshold that guarantees 
debt repayment under all states of nature).  
It should be recognized that the definition of sustainability used here is a very 
conservative one because it insures the public sector against default even under the worst 
scenario (in which revenue remains at its minimum forever). Furthermore, by considering 
sustainable only those levels of debt that are less than or equal to the level of debt that 
can always be repaid, the model implicitly assumes that creditors obtain complete 
insurance. Creditors of emerging market countries clearly do not expect such insurance, 
and this is reflected in sovereign spreads.
35  
                                                 
35 However, note that this analysis is carried out using world average interest rates, which are much lower 
than the rates typically used for sustainability analysis, precisely because of the assumption of the 
government’s full ability to repay.  
  33This simple exercise points out that Ecuador’s fiscal position is far from being a 
slack one. The current level of debt appears to be sustainable (in the probabilistic 
definition) only if we are ready to assume high flexibility in government expenditure. As 
mentioned before, Ecuador has been able to swiftly reduce government non-interest 
expenditure in the recent past, amidst a dramatic macroeconomic crisis that involved 
huge swings in the exchange rate.  However, it should be pointed out that such 
adjustment may much more difficult to reproduce under dollarization, given that it would 
probably take a long time for the real exchange rate to adjust through a recession.  
  We now turn to model simulation.  Based on the assumptions presented in Table 
2, we perform 500 simulations of the model, which implies obtaining 500 possible tax 
revenue paths, based on mean revenue of 23.7 percent of GDP and the volatility and 
persistence previously obtained. Assuming that the government keeps expenditure 
constant at its mean level, we can estimate the probability of hitting the debt threshold in 
the future.  Taking as initial debt the level prevailing at end-2003 (54 percent of GDP), 
we compute the relative frequency distribution of government debt n periods ahead and 
then estimate the probability of entering a crisis. Figure 7 indicates that the probability of 
entering an adjustment phase within three periods is rather large (34 percent), and it 
increases after 6 periods to almost 50 percent 
 
 
Figure 7. Probability of Hitting the Debt Threshold n Periods Ahead 
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Note: Initial Debt Level is 54% of GDP.
  34One of the main advantages of the probabilistic model is that, by providing a 
distribution for the probability of hitting a crisis, it highlights the current vulnerability of 
the fiscal stance.  By warning of possible negative outcomes with sufficient anticipation, 
it offers a chance for the authorities to correct fiscal policy before hitting debt thresholds.  
 
Sudden Stop Approach to Sustainability 
 
We now focus on the fiscal distress that is typically generated by shocks to financing of 
the current account, or Sudden Stops in capital flows.  As stated in Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Talvi (2003), this type of shock has been quite relevant for emerging markets, 
particularly so following the Russian crisis of 1998.  These events can be interpreted as 
shocks to credit.  A fall in the financing of the current account deficit implies a forced 
adjustment in the absorption of tradable goods.  To the extent that consumption of non-
tradable goods is a complement in consumption of tradable goods, a fall in the latter will 
imply a fall in the former, leading to a decrease in non-tradable prices.  Since for a small 
open economy tradable prices are taken as a given, this implies that the real exchange 
rate will have to adjust.  Adjustment in the real exchange rate will generate valuation 
effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio, which, in turn, affects fiscal sustainability. 
The potential of fiscal distress following a Sudden Stop for a country like 
Ecuador was much larger in 2002, when its current account deficit reached 5.4 percent of 
GDP, than in 2003, when it was substantially reduced to 1.6 percent of GDP.
36  Still, 
Ecuador is also exposed to shocks to the current account that could work just like a 
Sudden Stop.  For instance, a fall in the price of oil or sudden drop in the flows of 
remittances
  would reduce resources available to finance other items of the current 
account deficit, generating effects similar to those of a Sudden Stop in capital flows.
37  
For the sake of illustration, we evaluate a large shock to the international price of 
oil that would reduce it to US$ 12 per barrel (close to the real average price of oil of 
1998), implying an equivalent fall in real terms of about 50 percent of the average price 
                                                 
36 Data from Banco Central de Ecuador and authors’ calculations. According to IMF figures, the current 
account deficit was 4.9 in 2002 and 1.7 in 2003 (source: IMF). 
37 While a country with full access to international capital markets could borrow to smooth these kinds of 
shocks, this is clearly not the case for Ecuador. 
  35prevailing at end-2003. Assuming that production of oil stays constant, this percentage 
price fall would be equivalent to a reduction in the value of net oil exports. Thus, 
financing could fall by slightly over US$ 1 billion, equivalent to a reduction of about 13 
percent in total imports. Assuming that the latter represents the needed percentage fall in 
the absorption of tradable goods, that a similar percentage fall in the demand for non-
tradable goods would take place (this would be the case with homothetic utility 
functions), and that the relative price elasticity of non-tradable goods has a value similar 
to that of other developing countries (approximately 0.4), this would yield a real 
depreciation of approximately 33 percent.
38 
To evaluate the effect of real depreciation on fiscal sustainability we need to 
make a number of assumptions regarding the currency composition of public debt, output 
composition, growth rates, and interest rates. Currency composition is the easiest; as 
Ecuador’s legal tender is the US dollar, we assume that 100 percent of the debt is in 
foreign currency.
39  It can be shown that real exchange rate fluctuations will have no 
valuation effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio as long as the ratio of debt in domestic 
currency (or in non-tradables, B) relative to debt in foreign currency (or in tradables, B*) 
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) and, as we have already pointed out, all of Ecuador’s debt is contracted in 





 is equal to zero indicating that a real depreciation will 
bring about valuation effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
                                                 
38 A real depreciation is defined as an increase in the price of tradable goods vis-à-vis that of non-tradable 
goods. For a detailed description of this calculation, see Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003). 
39 Although Ecuador still has some outstanding debt in Sucres, the dollarization of the economy implies a 
fixed exchange rate for that debt, which will probably be paid in foreign currency at its maturity. Thus, for 
the present exercise we have assumed that all of Ecuador’s domestic debt is denominated in foreign 
currency. 
40 See Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003). 
  36We now put Ecuador’s data to the test by analyzing the effect on the required 
primary surplus (using standard sustainability analysis) of a RER depreciation triggered 
by a fall in the price of oil; the results are shown in Table 3.  We conduct the exercise 
under four different assumptions for the real interest rate (and use the same steady state 
growth rate employed in the Mendoza-Oviedo framework). Artana, Tour and Navajas 
(2002) estimate that the average interest rate of the public debt of Ecuador in 2002 was 
7.22 percent.  However, this interest rate is low given the large share of concessional debt 
in Ecuador’s total debt.  Looking into the future, a more realistic rate for this analysis 
would be the interest rate prevailing in post debt-restructuring Global bonds, under the 
assumption that concessional debt will eventually be replaced by market-placed debt.  
Thus, we construct an average of the interest rate of fixed rate Global 2012 bonds and the 
one that will prevail in the long run for Global 2030 bonds, which yields a value of 11 
percent (for comparison purposes, we also include two alternative interest rate scenarios 
discussed by Artana, Tour and Navajas (2002) of 12 percent and 14 percent, 
respectively). 
We focus our analysis on the second scenario, with a real interest rate of 11 
percent, which we consider more realistic.  In this scenario, the government’s observed 
primary surplus for 2003 is slightly below the surplus that would stabilize debt in a no-
shock scenario, equivalent to 4.5 percent of GDP (exercise a in Table 3).  Once the 
valuation effect of real exchange rate depreciation following the fall in oil prices kicks in, 
the required primary surplus would increase to 5.24 percent (one point of GDP above the 
observed primary surplus).  Exercises c and d recognize that negative external shocks 
such as a fall in oil prices are often accompanied by higher interest rates and lower 
growth, and they examine the consequences of such negative shocks. For example, an 
increase of 200 basis points in interest rates, coupled with a fall in growth of 1 percent 
would increase the required primary surplus by an additional 2 percentage points to about 
7.2 percent of GDP.  
Finally, we take into account the fact that in many recent crises, governments 
have bailed out banks in trouble, particularly because of the emergence of non-
performing foreign currency loans handed to non-tradable sectors that go bankrupt after a 
substantial rise in the RER. Therefore, we analyze the potential impact that contingent 
  37liabilities in the financial sector could have on fiscal sustainability (López-Cálix, 2003, 
discusses the main vulnerabilities of Ecuador’s financial sector).  We assume that the 
entire loan portfolio of the banking system is denominated in terms of tradable goods.  In 
order to calculate the share of loans allocated to the non-tradable sector, we exclude loans 
to the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors weighed by the fraction of output of 
these sectors that is actually exported
41 from the total loan portfolio of the Ecuadorian 
banking system.
42 We estimate that bank loans allocated to the non-tradable sector were 
about 12.6 percent of GDP by 2003.  For illustrative purposes, we assume that 20 percent 
of these loans go into default following a rise in the RER, and that the government 
incorporates this amount into their liabilities following a bailout.  Thus, public sector 
debt would increase by 2.5 points of GDP.  Exercise e shows that including such 
contingent liabilities in the analysis would increase the required surplus to 7.5 percent of 
GDP.  In the event that all these factors materialized jointly (as outlined in exercises b 
through e), not an uncommon event in times of crisis, the current primary surplus, which, 
by historical standards is very high, would not be sufficient to stabilize debt.  It should be 
noted that this exercise highlights the valuation effects of the change in relative prices 
following the fall in the price of oil, but it does not take into account the direct effect on 
the government’s budget that lower royalties on oil would entail, unless this effect were 
to be buffered by the use of Ecuador’s oil fund.   
 
                                                 
41 Hence, we assume that credit allocated to tradable activities within each sector is proportional to the 
share of exports in that sector’s output 
42 Information on loan allocation refers to September 2003 and is from the Ecuadorian Banking and 
Insurance Superintendency.  For the construction of these weights we used sectoral GDP and exports as of 
2001 from Ecuadorian Central Bank statistics. 
  38Table 3. Sudden Stop Exercise (Fall in Oil prices to US$ 12 pb) 
 
   1  2  3  4 
Basic Assumptions      
Debt over GDP ((B+B*)/(Y+Y*) )  54.0% 
Interest rate (r)  7.22%  11%  12%  14% 
Steady state GDP Growth (θ )   2.50% 
Fall in Oil Net Exports/Imports of G&S  13.15% 
Real Depreciation  32.88% 
          
 Actual Primary Surplus   4.3% 
        
Sustainability analysis      
Required Primary surplus:         
 a. Base Exercise (no shock)  2.49%  4.48%  5.01%  6.06% 
 b. Change in Relative Prices (valuation effect)  2.91%  5.24%  5.86%  7.09% 
 c. b + Increase in Interest Rate of 200 BPS   4.14%  6.47%  7.09%  8.32% 
 d. c + Decrease in GDP Growth of 1 percent   4.81%  7.16%  7.78%  9.03% 
 e. d + Contingent Liabilities 2.54 percent of
GDP   5.03%  7.49%  8.14%  9.45% 
 
Note: All data refer to 2003. 
 
 
A similar exercise was conducted to analyze the impact of a Sudden Stop in 
capital flows.  As Ecuador has closed much of its current account gap between 2002 and 
2003 (the 2003 current account deficit was about 1.6 percent of GDP), a Sudden Stop in 
capital flows would imply a limited real depreciation (estimated at 15.4 percent) and 
would not lead to large valuation effects.  In fact, Table 4 estimates that the plain 
valuation effect on the primary surplus would range between 0.23 percent of GDP 
(column 1) and 0.57 percent of GDP (column 4).  Compared to the adjustment that 
followed the Sudden Stop in 1998-1999 (when the current account deficit was 11 percent 
of GDP and the change in the current account balance from 1998 to 1999 was almost 50 
percent of imports), we find that, in under current conditions, a Sudden Stop of capital 
flows is not an important source of vulnerability for the Ecuadorian economy. However, 
exercises c, d, and e in Table 4 show that, even with this limited current account deficit, 
shocks that typically accompany a Sudden Stop in capital flows could have serious 
consequences. 
  39 
Table 4. Sudden Stop Exercise  
(Depreciation needed to close the current account deficit) 
 
   1  2  3  4 
Basic Assumptions      
Debt over GDP ((B+B*)/(Y+Y*) )  54.0% 
Interest rate (r)  7.22%  11%  12%  14% 
Steady state GDP Growth (θ )   2.50% 
Real Depreciation  15.38% 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we survey the recent literature on fiscal sustainability with special focus on 
emerging market countries. We highlight that, because of greater uncertainty and high 
revenue volatility, standard sustainability analysis is not easily applicable to emerging 
market countries. With these considerations in mind, we describe in detail a model that 
aims at evaluating sustainability by using probabilistic methods. We conclude our 
discussion with an application to the case of Ecuador. 
We find that although Ecuador’s fiscal stance has improved substantially in recent 
years, the introduction of uncertainty in tax revenue shows that there is a positive 
probability that the country could enter fiscal crisis in the near future.  This is particularly 
so because there seems to be high inflexibility in government non-interest expenditure, 
and high volatility in government revenue that leave the country vulnerable to external 
shocks, as evidenced by two defaults on external debt throughout the 1990s. 
 Furthermore, even though Ecuador greatly improved its external position and, by 
reducing its current account deficit, lowered the potential impact of a Sudden Stop in 
capital flows, the country is still susceptible to external shocks to the current account. In 
particular, we showed that an oil shock can work like a Sudden Stop in capital flows and 
have a substantial fiscal cost.  
These results show that, although current primary surpluses are roughly consistent 
with a no-shock scenario, Ecuador needs to make further efforts toward fiscal 
consolidation that accounts for its sources of volatility.  This is particularly important 
because dollarization, while doing away with credibility problems related to poor 
monetary policy, has left fiscal policy as the only instrument available for buffering 
  40shocks.  Therefore, much more flexibility in fiscal policy is required.  This can be 
achieved through a reduction in expenditure entitlements and the consolidation of a 
reliable oil stabilization fund, as well as by reducing public debt levels.    
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